Divine Command Theory

The Divine Command Theory

And Euthyphro's Dilemma

Rule Deontologists argue that there are objective moral obligations that are universal, or binding on all moral agents. But Consequentialists, like the Ethical Egoist or Utilitarian, also believe that moral obligations are objective and universal. Moral codes receive their objectivity and universality from the fact that all persons desire happiness (i.e., pleasure) and wish to avoid unhappiness (i.e., pain). But the Deontological theorist cannot look to the consequences of actions to find moral worth (remember that for them, the ends never justify the means). So, how else might one claim that a moral code is at once universally binding and objective?

One way to secure objectivity and universality for a moral code is to suppose that it is necessarily dependent on the existence of God.

NOTE: For the purposes of our discussion, it will be important to define 'god' as a perfect being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. We'll discuss this and other possible definitions of 'god' in greater detail in the Metaphysics Unit.

IF God exists, and IF God created the universe (i.e., the set of everything that is), then morality will be one of the things created by God. If God created morality, THEN it will follow that there is an objective standard of moral conduct, which is binding on all beings intended by God to be ruled by that set of normative principles. So, one way to argue for the objectivity and universality of moral codes is to argue that morality is necessarily dependent on a divine creator. This is the argument of the Divine Command Theory (hereafter, just DCT).

Definition: The Divine Command Theory is a rule deontological theory of Normative Ethics which maintains that moral assessment is relative to the will of God.

For the DCT morality consists in nothing more than the will of God and can be expressed in the following propositions:

An action is right if and only if it is commanded by God;
an action is wrong if and only if it is prohibited by God;
an action is permissible if and only if it is neither commanded nor prohibited by God.

Perhaps the moral theory most common to humanity for the vast majority of history has been the DCT. When we survey the moral codes of early civilizations around the world we discover at their heart a religious foundation. That is, the moral code is most often understood within and justified by the mythological framework of a particular society. We find a classical expression of this in the character "Euthyphro" in Plato's dialogue of the same name. But Plato, and perhaps the historical Socrates as well, recognizes a flaw lying at the heart of the DCT. If morality consists of nothing more than the will of God, isn't morality arbitrary? That is, what's to stop God from deciding that what was moral yesterday is immoral today, and that what's moral today will be immoral tomorrow? It appears that the very same action could be moral at one time and immoral at another, which undermines the very objectivity the DCT attempts to secure!

Socrates Demonstrates the central flaw of the DCT by posing a paradox to his young interlocutor:

Euthyphro's Paradox: Is an action holy because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is holy?

We can substitute the word 'right' for 'holy', 'commanded' for 'loved' and a more abstract notion of divinity and we get, "Is an action right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right?" There are two components to this disjunction -

An action is right because it is commanded by God.
An action is commanded by God because it is right.

The difference between these two propositions is of fundamental importance in ethical theory. The DCT asserts 1: rightness amounts to nothing more than God's willing a particular action. If God commands us to love our parents, the we should. If God commands us to kill our parents, then patricide is moral. If God commands us to murder our family, then murdering our family is the right thing to do. To say that something is right is to say nothing more than it is commanded by God.

But, as Socrates points out to Euthyphro, there seems to be something terribly wrong in this analysis. There are some things which, even if commanded by God, just seem to be wrong; there seem to be some things which God simply cannot command. This is clarified in 2 above: actions are not right because God commands them, they are commanded because they are right. That is, the standard of rightness is independent of God's will. God does not create moral rightness, rather it is recognized by God.

There is a further problem with the DCT which we ought to note. Let's us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we were willing to bite the bullet and assert along with Euthyphro that morality really is nothing more than whatever God has commanded. It is essential for us to know what God has commanded. But how do we know that? Many different religions claim to have God's revelation, but which one is correct? It wouldn't matter so much if all religions agreed, but they don't? So, how do we decide which religion to follow? Unless there is some objective standards by which to judge the various claims of different religions, we end up making an arbitrary judgment in favor of the one we like (usually the religion of our own culture), which brings us right back to the problem of Moral Relativism which Pojman demonstrated was so flawed.

Fortunately, the DCT is not the only way to secure the objectivity and universality of a moral code and be a deontologist at the same time. Immanuel Kant will argue that morality is, like mathematics, dictated by reason. Thus, any rational animal must come to the same answers about morality because they are rational.

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