• What is the nature of moral language (i.e., how does moral language work)? and

• Are moral codes objective or relative (i.e., are there moral facts, or are moral codes reducible to social or personal preferences)?

These questions are about the very nature of our moral codes themselves, and their answers give us absolutely no guidance for our behavior. That is why this part of ethical theory is referred to as 'Non-Normative'

Definition: 'Non-Normative Ethics' is the systematic or philosophical investigation into the objectivity of moral codes and the nature of moral language.

Notice that these kinds of questions are applicable to any moral theory whatsoever! Or, to put it another way, we don't have to know anything about a specific normative theory to worry about its objectivity and/or the meaningfulness of its language.

We are going to focus on the first of these problems (i.e., the objectivity of moral codes), but I want to give you a brief overview of Metaethics, or the systematic investigation of the nature of moral language.

1. First, we must begin with some Basic Terminology -
   1. Moral Designators - those terms used to label actions within an ethical system
      1. 'Right' ('should' or 'ought') - any action which is justified by and consistent with a moral framework; a right action always implies an obligation on anyone who accepts that moral system,

      2. 'Wrong' ('should not' or 'ought not') - any action which fails to be justified by, or is inconsistent with, a moral framework; an action forbidden to a anyone who accepts the ethical system,

         Not every human action can be labeled 'right' or 'wrong'; some actions just don't seem to fit neatly into those two categories. Thus, we have a third designator:

      3. 'Permissible' - any action which is not forbidden by a moral framework, but that does not imply an obligation.

         Again, however, we can draw a distinction between two types of permissible acts based on their praiseworthiness. Some acts are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy and are therefore labeled

         1. 'neutral actions' - actions which have no moral implications whatsoever.
            

            On the other hand, however, there are a class of actions we may want to praise when they are performed, but which still seem to lack any positive moral obligation. Such actions go beyond our moral expectations and help draw the distinction between ordinary moral agents and moral saints. These actions are often called

         2. 'Supererogatory/Altruistic' - actions which are deemed 'good' but which carry no obligations (i.e., altruistic actions, good Samaritanism, etc.)

With these terms clearly defined, we can now draw one of the most difficult, but important, distinctions in moral theory: the distinction between 'right' and 'good'. We might be tempted to use these two terms interchangably, and indeed, there are some moral theorists who may want to argue that we can. However, it seems to me that there is a distinction to be made between that which is good, and that which is right. The scope of the latter is more narrow than the former. That is, all right actions will be good, but not every good action will be right. This will be the case if we have properly defined the term 'right' as that which implies an obligation. To make this more clear, consider the following example: Suppose we agree that some particular action, say giving food to the indigent, is altruistic (i.e., I have no moral obligation to do it). If I give the homeless person some food, my action can fairly be said to be good. However, if I am under no obligation to do it, then my action CANNOT be labeled 'right'. Right actions ALWAYS IMPLY AN OBLIGATION; hence, any action which is not obligatory, even if it is good (or praiseworthy), cannot be accurately labeled 'right'.

With this basic terminology under our belt we are ready to move on to our overview of Non-Normative Ethics.

1. Metaethics - The Problem of Moral Language

   One of the most interesting problems for the study of Ethics rests on a question of linguistic analysis: Does moral language, the language of 'should' and 'ought', 'right' and 'wrong', have cognitive content? That is, what, if anything, are we communicating to each other through the use of moral designators? When we engage in a moral conversation are we using language in a special or ordinary way?

   1. The different uses of Language -

      It is held by many philosophers that langauge can be used in at least two distinct ways: to describe the world around us, or to express our preferences about the world. The first use of language is called 'descriptive', the second 'normative'.

      1. Descriptive Language - Language designed to reflect the way the universe actually is (i.e., facts about the world)
         1. 2 < 3
         2. The sky is blue.
         3. Whales are larger than kittens.
         4. The human gestation period is nine months.
         5. Paris is the capital of Italy.

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         NOTE: It is important to remember that an assertion need not be true to be descriptive. The proposition "Paris is the capital of Italy" is descriptive, but false. The important feature to keep in mind is that a descriptive use of language will have a truth-value (i.e., either be true or false). This does not seem to be the case with normative language.

         ---

      2. Normative Language - Language which reflects the way we want the world to be (our preferences, desires, or [non-factual] beliefs about the world)
         1. Blue is prettier than green.
         2. Pink Floyd is the best rock and roll band of all time.
         3. Country music sucks.
         4. It's better to die free than to live in slavery.

It is important to recognize the difference between descriptive and normative propositions because they serve radically different functions in human communication. Descriptive language helps us understand the environment in which we live which is vital for our continued survival. Normative language, on the other hand, expresses our desires beyond mere survival; it helps us form a concept of what we want our lives to be, or the meaning we wish to find in it.

The central problem of Metaethics is to understand how moral language works. Is moral language more like normative language, or is it more like descriptive language? On the surface it would appear that moral language is normative. But notice that if that is the case, no moral proposition will have a truth value! That is, if someone asked the question, "Is it true that telling lies is immoral?" we would not be able to answer the question. If moral language is normative the proposition "Telling lies is wrong" is neither true nor false! This observation has led many ethicists to argue that moral language is not normative after all. But if it is not, then they must give us an explanation of precisely how moral language works.

We're going to leave the question of Metaethics at this point and turn instead to its Non-Normative correlary, Descriptivism. If there are no moral facts, then moral codes would seem to be substantially relative. But, relative to what, or whom? Further, what evidence is there, beyond the metaethical issues, that would lead us to think that moral codes are relative? More importantly, what are the consequences of thinking that moral codes are relative? These questions lie at the heart of that part of Non-Normative Ethics called 'Descriptivism'. Our editor, Louis Pojman, addresses these questions directly in his essay, and he offers us an alternative to Moral Relativism.