I. Evaluation of Kant’s ethical view:
A. In favor of Kant’s ethical view:
1. Rational, consistent, impartial: Kant’s
view emphasizes the importance of rationality, consistency, impartiality, and
respect for persons in the way we live our lives. If Kant is correct that moral absolutes
cannot be violated, then he prevents any loopholes, self-serving exceptions,
and personal biases in the determination of our duties.
2. Intrinsic worth of a human being: In
virtue of being a human being, you have rights, dignity, and intrinsic moral
worth/value.
3. A moral framework for rights: As a
culture here in the
4. Non-relativistic rights and duties: These
moral rights and duties transcend all societies and all contexts, so Kant’s
view doesn’t have the problems of cultural relativism. Relativism/subjectivism kind of objection
won't work against Kant's view. No
empirical appeal will have any effect on Kant.
You need to point out inconsistencies within his system.
5. Autonomy and ability to choose your moral
projects: It’s a duty to pursue your happiness through
the use of reason, as long as you’re not lying, breaking your promises, or
committing suicide (or any other duty as determined by the categorical
imperative formulations).
6. Alternative:
Consequences? Can we ever be completely sure about the
consequences of our actions? Haven’t
there been times when you thought you were doing the best thing, based on the
anticipated consequences, but the results turned out badly? Kant’s view avoids consequences in making
ethical decisions, so it doesn’t have such a problem.
B. Against Kant’s ethical view:
1. Is the good will always good without
qualification? Can’t I be a do-gooder who always tries to do
my duty but creates misery instead? For
example, say that I’m helping my kids, but they don’t want to be helped. If it’s my duty to help, I am supposed to
help them. Single-minded focus on my
duty coupled with a self-righteous or insensitive blindness to the consequences
of my actions could be a form of moral fanaticism. Could this be a problem for Kant’s ethics?
2. Consistency of Categorical Imperative? Are the
formulations consistent? Kant says they
are, but how can we be sure? It wouldn't
seem like we should lie EVER, but if we use someone else as a means, or allow
others to use people solely as a means by NOT lying, isn't this morally
objectionable?
3. How can Kant deal with this hard case? It's
1939, and you're hiding Jews in a cellar.
The Nazi's come to the door and ask you if you're hiding Jews in a
cellar. Should you lie to Nazi's? Is
this a good objection to Kant? Possible,
un-Kantian REPLY: What about a hierarchy
of duties? There are two reasons why
this won't work: (i) if there's a hierarchy, you need to have a criteria for
deciding where an imperative is on the scale, and all categorical imperatives
give absolute, inescapable duties; (ii) Kant doesn't allow a hierarchy. By not lying, Kant would say that you will
have done your duty, and it is the stranger who is responsible for the murder
and not you.
4. Two objections from David Hume:
a. Hume's first objection: Reason
doesn't discover moral rules. Morality is feeling, affect, or
sentiment. REPLY: To base morality solely on feeling and
emotion is equivalent to individual relativism, and so Hume’s view has the
problems associated with individual relativism, already mentioned elsewhere.
b. Hume's second objection: Reason
doesn't motivate moral action. Suppose Kant is right that reason discovers
moral duties. So what? What happens then? We need to have action. Is reason sufficient to motivate us to do our
duty? Suppose reason discovers Action A
is a duty. In order to do Action A, do I
need something else, such as a desire or an inclination to decide to do Action
A, or is it enough to know that Action A is my duty? Hume says we need to have a desire or an
inclination to do the right action, even if we know that it's the right
action. In fact, for Hume, first we need
a desire or an inclination to do something, then we
look to reason to fulfill it. "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of
the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey
them." Treatise concerning Human
Nature (Bk.II, Part III, Sec. III, p. 415)
5. Akrasia (weakness of will or moral conviction): You
see/know what the right action to do is, you want to do the good action, but
you fail to do the good action. You do
the bad action. Is akrasia
possible? Everyone but Plato, Kant, my
advisor and me and a few others think it is not. Everyone else thinks it exists.
6. What about non-human animals? According
to Kant, we only have a duty to treat rational moral agents as ends, not
animals. What about chimps that have
99.4% of our DNA structure? What about
senile people or the comatose? Are these
people things as opposed to ends in themselves, as "normal" people
are, according to Kant?
7. Practical Application Problems: How do we draw the maxim, given that the
Categorical Imperative can give us different answers depending on the
formulation? For example, I could consistently
draw the maxim that “No one should eat raw oysters” if I don’t like them, or
“Everyone should tie his or her right shoe first”, just based on my preference,
and these would be morally binding on all moral agents.
II. EVALUATION OF UTILITARIANISM:
A.
In favor of Mill’s Ethical view:
1. Intuitive in general: It links
happiness with morality, instead of pitting happiness maybe against morality
(such as Kant’s view). We think it makes
sense with common beliefs about morality.
E.g., in general, it backs up murder's being wrong, lying, rights. So Utilitarianism gives one a system to our
intuitions.
2. Practical, clear-cut
procedure: Utilitarianism doesn’t rely on vague
intuitions or abstract principles. It
allows psychologists and sociologists to determine what makes people happy and
which policies promote the social good.
3. Impartial, fair,
social harmony: Utilitarianism requires us to balance our
interests with those of others.
4. Common sense - Pain is
bad, pleasure is good: Everything being equal, though people have
many different and conflicting moral beliefs, people agree that pain is bad,
and pleasure is good.
5. Flexible and sensitive
to circumstances (Act more than Rule): Utilitarianism does not
rigidly label actions as absolutely right or wrong (though certain actions like
lying should always be wrong), and it allows flexibility and sensitivity to the
circumstances surrounding an action.
This makes it practical.
B. Against
Mill’s Ethical View:
1. Negative
Responsibility: According to
Utilitarianism, you're morally responsible for:
a. The things you didn't do but could have done to
maximize happiness; and
b. The things that you could have prevented others
from doing that decrease overall happiness; as well as for:
c. What you actually do to maximize/increase
happiness.
E.g., If you go out and play tennis, you could be doing something (almost certainly) to increase the overall happiness of the world instead. Therefore, Utilitarianism is an excessively demanding theory: You need/may need to give up a lot, if not everything, in order to do the moral thing.
2. Lack of Autonomy/Integrity of the
Moral Agent: Utilitarianism takes moral
responsibility out of the realm of personal autonomy. The agent isn't able to choose his/her own
moral projects. If you like the idea of
choosing your own moral projects, Utilitarianism is not for you.
3. Can people not be
wrong about what is pleasurable? Do we
really want to let everyone decide for him or herself what is pleasurable? Can I mistake what in fact will really bring
me pleasure and what will not? Would we
think this is a good theory with which to handle or raise children? Should we ask them what they would like to
eat or drink and maximize their pleasure, especially if they outnumber us and
are much more excited about having something than we parents or adults are
about their having it? How can Mill
really answer this question, given that he only says that we need to
differentiate between noble and base pleasures?
Even after we’ve differentiated them, Mill can still not ignore what
“ignorant” people are wanting or find pleasurable. Is this a problem?
4. Hard Cases: ACT Utilitarianism may require us to commit
morally reprehensible acts:
a. Prisoners of War: You get
a gun handed to you, "If you don't shoot this prisoner, then 10 others will
die." What should you do? Utilitarianism requires you to shoot the
prisoner.
b. Terrorist group
example: You have access to the child of a ruthless
terrorist who has a nuclear weapon aimed at your city. If you torture the child, you can get the
terrorist to stop the bombing action.
Should you torture the child?
Utilitarianism might require you to torture the child to ensure the
safety of the whole city.
c. Rotten Professor example. Suppose there's a really ornery, mean
professor who has no living relatives (or if he does, they all don't like him!)
and who happens to be very healthy!
Suppose you're his doctor who knows that there are 5 people looking for
organs - two have a failing kidney, one a heart, one a liver, and one needs
some corneas. The question is, if no one
would know about it, should you kill the professor to donate the organs for
transplants? There would be happiness
created by every “donee” and his/her family and friends, plus the students of
the rotten professor! Therefore,
Utilitarianism says we should kill the rotten professor.
5. Conflict of Rules for
the Rule Utilitarian? What if rules conflict in a moral
situation? EX: I find myself in a situation where I need to
decide between helping someone in need, or keeping a
promise I made to be somewhere at a certain time. What would a Rule Utilitarian say I should
do? Either keep my promise (because the
rule of keeping promises maximizes happiness) or help the person (because the
rule of helping people in need maximizes happiness). In this case, Rule Utilitarian doesn’t say
what to do – so it seems that when the rules conflict, we have to collapse Rule
Utilitarianism into Act Utilitarianism
6. [ Bentham’s bodily pleasures and Mill’s noble pleasures: On the one hand, how can Bentham think that bodily pleasures are better or more valuable than the pleasures of the mind? On the other hand, how can Mill argue that one pleasure is better or more valuable than another? Doesn’t he need something other than pleasure to argue that one pleasure is better than another? If this is wrong, aren’t we back to Bentham’s view? ]